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Partisan Polarization and Congressional

Accountability in House Elections
David R. Jones Baruch College and the Graduate Center, City University of New York
Early research led scholars to believe that institutional accountability in Congress is lacking because public evaluations of its collective performance do not affect the reelection of its members. However, a changed partisan environment along with new empirical evidence raises unanswered questions about the effect of congressional performance on incumbents' electoral outcomes over time. Analysis of House reelection races across the last several decades produces important findings:
(1) low congressional approval ratings generally reduce the electoral margins of majority party incumbents and increase margins for minority party incumbents; (2) partisan polarization in the House increases the magnitude of this partisan differential, mainly through increased electoral accountability among majority party incumbents; (3) these electoral effects of congressional performance ratings hold largely irrespective of a members individual party loyalty or seat safety. These findings carry significant implications for partisan theories of legislative organization and help explain salient features of recent Congresses.
For more than half a century, political scientists and political observers alike have been concerned with the lack of governmental accountability in the United States (American Political Science Associa tion [APSA] 1950). Of particular concern has been the lack of institutional accountability on the part of the U.S.
Congress (APSA 1950, 7-9) . The overwhelming consen sus of scholars is that individual members face no electoral consequences for the performance of the collectivity (e.g., Arnold 1990 ; Committee on the Constitutional System 1985; Fenno 1975 Fenno , 1978 Fiorina 1980; Jacobson 2004; Mayhew 1974) .1 In his textbook on congressional elections, Jacobson sums up the dominant view that "members are not held individually responsible for their collective performance in governing" and as a result "a crucial form of representation is missing" (2004, 227) .
For the most part, critiques of the lack of electoral accountability for congressional performance have fo cused on one primary culprit: weak congressional parties (e.g., APSA 1950; Committee on the Constitutional Sys tem 1985 ; Fenno 1975 Fenno , 1978 Fiorina 1980 ). According to this view, a lack of unity within congressional par ties undermines electoral accountability because it helps to obscure who is to blame for perceived congressional
shortcomings. This conventional wisdom, however, was largely formed during a different congressional era. Partisan polarization has steadily increased since the mid-1970s (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Rohde 1991) . This increase in partisan behavior in Congress is consistent with many of the reforms that APSA and others have pro posed as necessary for collective accountability (Sinclair 2006, 344) . This raises an important question: have in creases in partisan polarization in Congress helped pro duce an increase in accountability such that individual members now face electoral consequences for the perfor mance of the collective Congress?
Although research has yet to directly test whether a changed congressional environment has led to increased electoral accountability for congressional performance, this notion does find some indirect support in the lit erature. While early studies of member behavior found that most members publicly bashed the institution of Congress (Fenno 1978) , recent evidence finds majority party members now trying to promote the public im age of Congress rather than denigrate it (Arnold 2004; Lipinski 2004) actual election outcomes over several decades. The find ings carry important implications for several avenues of research, including validation of previously untested as sumptions underlying procedural cartel theory McCubbins 1993, 2005) , new empirical justification for the predictions of conditional party government theory (Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Rohde 1991) ,and an electoral explanation for the well-documented rise in both attack politics (Mann and Ornstein 2006) and leg islative gridlock (Sinclair 2006) (1978, 167) In other words, a lack of cohesive parties facilitates each members ability to deflect personal blame by making it difficult for constituents to readily determine who is ac tually responsible for policy actions and outcomes. Using similar logic, Morris Fiorina's essay "The Decline of Col lective Responsibility in American Politics" theorizes that with stronger parties, "the subordination of individual officeholders to the party lessens their ability to separate themselves from party actions. Like it or not their perfor mance becomes identified with the performance of the collectivity" (1980, (26) (27) degree of polarization might affect the impact of congres sional performance on an incumbent's election results.
The first, and most basic way, is by boosting the extent to which a party label serves as a brand name affecting the electoral fortunes of all members who run under that label (on party brands generally, see McCubbins 1993, 2005) . For majority party incumbents, the logic is similar to that suggested by Fiorina (1980) . As the party grows more internally cohesive and distinct from the mi nority party?voting more and more as a unified block that determines outcomes in the House?the public will more readily associate the majority party label with the performance of the institution. As a result, each incum bent running under that party label will find it more difficult to disassociate herself from public perceptions of congressional performance, and these perceptions will have a greater effect on her electoral fortunes. In par ticular, the more the public approves of Congress's per formance, the higher the proportion of votes majority party incumbents will receive on Election Day, all else being equal. Conversely, low congressional approval rat ings will have a negative effect on their electoral vote margins.
On the minority party side, theoretical expectations regarding the effects of party polarization are less clear. The literature says almost nothing about minority party brands, and we cannot assume that the two party brands are reciprocal rather than independent of one another.
One hypothesis is that the logic for the minority party will simply be the reverse of that for the majority party.
Specifically, as the minority party becomes more cohesive in its opposition to the majority party, the public may more readily associate the minority party label with op position to what is going on in Congress. In this case, when Congress is unpopular, minority party incumbents would have an even easier time running against Congress simply by presenting themselves as members of the op position party. The minority party label would also in creasingly connote opposition to any positive things that may come out of Congress. Thus, the more the public ap proves of Congress, the worse minority party incumbents would do at the polls. However, there is also good reason to hypothesize that increased party cohesion might not make much of a difference at all. If Fenno's (1978) Stimson (2004) notes that because "aggregation gain" cancels out random, uninformed views and "opinion leadership" magnifies the views of the informed, in the aggregate the electorate actually behaves quite rationally. All that is required for this hypothesis, then, is that at least some segment of the electorate has a general sense of how supportive their member has been of the majority party in Congress. We know that members of Congress actively try to define themselves to their constituents in relation to what is going on in the rest of Congress (Fenno 1978; Lipinski 2004 ) and that members' efforts to communicate information about their roll-call votes can be successful (Lipinski 2001) . In addition, Gronke, Koch, and Wilson (2003) show that voters are able to accurately estimate their member's support for presidentially supported leg islation and use this information in making their electoral decisions. Based on this evidence, it seems reasonable that even if not every voter has an accurate sense of her mem ber's party loyalty, some voters will. In the aggregate, the influence of these voters may be enough to mean that electoral accountability for congressional performance is based, in part, on each incumbent's level of loyalty to her party.
Data and Method
The The question at the heart of this study is whether or not individual members face electoral accountability for collective congressional performance. There are several potential avenues of electoral accountability that could be considered. For example, poor congressional perfor mance ratings might lead to increases in strategic retire ments or in quality challenges to incumbents (Jacobson and Kernell 1983) . In this study, however, I have chosen The key independent variable in the analysis is the public's evaluation of congressional job performance:
Congressional approval.7 Survey questions on congres sional approval have only been asked irregularly, in a variety of nonstandard forms, and rarely before the mid 1970s. Following the practice of Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht (1997) , I use James Stimson's (1999) (2002) and Jacobson (1989 (2002) . 16 Other studies using this control variable include Jacobson (1996) and Lipinski, Bianco, and Work (2003 Based on the work of Fiorina (1980) and others, I hypoth esized that majority party members would face greater ac countability for congressional performance as the party became more cohesive. Consistent with this hypothesis, the positive and significant coefficient for this interactive term among majority party incumbents demonstrates that as the majority party has grown more and more co hesive, congressional approval has had a greater positive effect on the electoral margins of its incumbents?with high congressional approval being even more helpful to majority members and low approval being even more harmful.
To guard against the possibility that this significant interactive effect might be spurious, I conducted addi For minority party incumbents, the story is a bit dif ferent. Given that the literature did not provide clear theo retical expectations, I offered two alternative hypotheses.
One hypothesis was that the pattern in the minority party would be the mirror image of that in the majority party?
increased party unity leading to a greater negative effect of congressional approval. The other (null) hypothesis was that if minority party members were already able to run against an unpopular Congress in the weak partisan environment of the 1970s?as indirectly suggested by the observations of Fenno (1978) ?then party unity may not play much of a role in determining the effect of congres sional approval among minority incumbents.
The results for minority incumbents in Model 2, Table 1 label allows an incumbent to successfully run against un popular Congresses. Given these findings, a question that naturally arises is whether or not members who exhibit substantial disloyalty to their party will diverge from the pattern set by the rest of their party. I hypothesized that disloyal members might not fit the typical pattern for their party. As discussed in the methods section, a simple test is whether or not the electoral effects of congressional approval differ when a member is a party maverick, voting more often with the opposing party than with her own.
The key variable in this test is the interaction between congressional approval and maverick status towards the bottom of Table 1 A final conditioning factor considered here is the role of seat safety. Some have argued that due to factors such as partisan gerrymandering, House incumbents have be come more and more safe electorally, and less and less subject to the electoral consequences of national forces (Kaplan 2006) . Since congressional performance evalua tions are treated here as a national force similar to other national forces such as presidential evaluations, it is pos sible that the effects found in Table 1 might not be signif icant among safe members and instead apply mainly to marginal members. To test this possibility, those incumbents who would traditionally be considered to have safe seats (those receiving more than 60% of the two-party vote in the last election?see Jacobson 2004) and those who would traditionally be considered to hold more marginal seats (those receiving 60% or below in the last election).
The results demonstrate that the significant effects of congressional approval found in Table 1 are also Table 2 , regardless of how safe a seat is. The coefficients in the top row show that, on average, con gressional approval has a significant positive effect among both safe and marginal majority party incumbents, and a significant negative effect among both safe and marginal minority party incumbents.26 The coefficients for the in teraction between congressional approval and party unity in the incumbent's party show that, similar to Table 1, this interaction is significantly positive among both safe and marginal majority party incumbents, and insignificant among both safe and marginal minority party incum bents. The coefficients for the interaction with individual party disloyalty, which were not significant in Table 1 ing a prominent theory of legislative parties. McCubbins's "procedural cartel theory" (1993, 2005 ) is based largely on the premise that majority party members always have an electoral incentive to cooperate in produc ing a collective legislative record. Yet this is the first study to demonstrate that evaluations of the collective perfor mance of Congress can lead to actual electoral gains or losses by majority party incumbents.
The second finding, that partisan polarization has in creased electoral accountability for majority party mem bers, offers a new empirical justification for theories of conditional party government (Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Rohde 1991) . Previously, conditional party government theory has sought to explain the relation ship between partisan polarization and the degree of centralization of legislative power in the majority party leadership largely in terms of members' rational pur suit of policy goals: as majority party members' policy preferences become more homogeneous, they are more willing to empower their party's leaders in order to achieve the legislative aims they hold in common. This study's findings suggest that rational pursuit of reelection can also explain the correlation between partisan polarization and members' willingness to empower party leaders. Lipinski (2004) finds that in the 1990s majority party members communicated pre dominantly positive messages about Congress (see also Arnold 2004) . The explanation for this temporal dif ference appears to be that members of Congress them selves recognize the changed realities described in this study. Majority party members realize that it is no longer an effective strategy to try to publicly posture as oppo nents of Congress given their party label. If disapproval of Congress hurts majority members' reelection prospects, then it makes more sense for them to try to "talk up"
Congress rather than running it down. It remains to be seen, however, whether or not such efforts can actually help to improve public evaluations of Congress. demonstrating that greater partisan polarization has pro duced higher levels of legislative gridlock in Congress (Jones 2001; Sinclair 2006 ). This second, more negative consequence of increased party unity is one that does not seem to have been an ticipated by the APSA (1950) and other proponents of strong parties. Indeed, the Committee on the Constitu tional System (1985) claimed that more cohesive parties would actually help to reduce gridlock.
In practice, it appears that partisan polarization en tails a trade-off. With polarization we get greater in stitutional accountability, but we also get more institu tional acrimony. Without polarization, accountability is diffused, but cooperation and collegiality are more likely. The finding that party polarization comes with both pos itive and negative consequences raises several important questions. Is it possible to have increased democratic ac countability without a corresponding increase in political acrimony? If the two must go hand in hand, has this been a reasonable trade-off, or do the costs to the political system outweigh the benefits? While there is a subjective element to these questions, it is also clear that more research into the systemic effects of party polarization is needed before we can begin to address them.
Appendix Including Earlier Elections in the Analysis
Extending the analysis in Table 1 , Model 2 backward in time is limited by two factors. First, in the 11 elections prior to 1976 there were only six for which any congres sional approval data could be found in the quarter prior to the election : 1954, 1958, 1964, 1968, 1970, and 1974 .
As a result, while this supplemental analysis extends back ward to 1954, it can add only these specific six elections to the 16 in the central analysis.30 Second, because the Federal Election Commission began its work in the 1976 cycle, candidate spending data prior to this election are either unavailable or unreliable (Sorauf 1992) . Therefore, to allow analysis of these earlier elections, the supplemen tal analysis necessarily excludes the controls for candidate spending found in Table 1 , Model 2. All other data and measures are as described in the text.
The results of the supplemental analysis are presented in Two coefficients that were not significant in Table 1, Model 2 are significant here. First, the interaction between congressional approval and average party unity is signif icant among minority party incumbents here, but not in Table 1 . However, because the slope is so shallow, there is actually no significant difference across the two mod els in the point estimate for the effect of congressional approval at any given level of average party unity in the data. Second, the interaction between congressional ap proval and maverick status is significant among minority incumbents here, but not in Table 1 . However, this differ ence appears to be attributable to the lack of controls for candidate spending: when candidate spending is removed from the analysis in Table 1 , the comparable interactive term appears significant there as well.
